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Abstract 
The policy of credit ceilings coupled with the use of imposed velocity in monetary 
management in Ghana was fraught with failures and undesirable effects during the decade 
of economic reform (1983-1992). The failures necessitated the removal of credit ceilings 
and the adoption of indirect control of money supply. An important requirement for 
monetary management using an indirect control is the determination of the absorptive 
capacity of the economy as well as the identification of the appropriate intermediate 
targets, operating variables and policy instruments. An ideal policy instrument is one 
that can be precisely measured, is achievable by the monetary authorities within a short 
period of time, serves as a visible signal regarding intent of policy to economic agents, 
and is related to intermediate targets. This paper proposes a financial programming model 
(encompassing both demand and supply of money) that may be used to target growth in 
monetary stock, identify the key sources of assets and forecast the portfolio of the 
corresponding bank liabilities. The major instruments identified include financial papers 
(Bank of Ghana and government treasury bills and bonds), discount quotas and reserve 
ratios. These may be supplemented with directives and moral suasion. The leading 
indicators for determining whether monetary policy is on track include changes in the 
rate of foreign exchange and the rate of inflation. 
I. Introduction: Focus and objective of the 
paper 
Overview 
The formulation of an optimum monetary policy to achieve economic objectives of full 
employment, rapid economic growth, price stability and balance of payments equilibrium 
would be simple and straightforward if policy makers knew completely and precisely 
how monetary aggregates and money market conditions are related to the economy. 
Barring this, the problem of trade-offs and conflicts that exists among policy objectives 
make macroeconomic management a difficult exercise. For example, in the short run, an 
attempt to achieve rapid economic growth may likely generate inflationary pressures, 
and consequently have an adverse effect on the balance of payments situation of a country. 
In order to minimize conflicts among policy objectives and to achieve desired policy 
targets, the monetary authority can manipulate variables that are under its direct control 
to effect changes indirectly in other policy variables to arrive at its ultimate goal (Meltzer, 
1969). 
The policy process is guided by an appropriate indicator that describes the stance of 
the policy. In principle, after deciding on the targets of GDP growth, employment and 
inflation, the monetary authority chooses a set of variables to "aim for" called intermediate 
targets (such as M l , M2, interest rates) that have a direct effect on investment and 
employment. The intermediate targets, however, are controlled indirectly through 
operating targets (treasury bill rate, free reserves and monetary base) in order to induce 
certain changes in ultimate target variables. In this framework, it is assumed that the 
monetary authority has partial knowledge of the domestic economic structure and that 
policy actions affect the economy with a lag. 
Prior to the implementation of financial sector reform in Ghana in 1988, monetary 
management involved essentially a myriad of financial sector controls. Monetary policy 
represented mainly credit creation to finance government budget deficits. To ensure easy 
access to credit, the government instituted direct monetary control measures such as 
fixed interest rates and sectoral credit ceilings, which produced, nevertheless, considerable 
price distortions in the economy. Thus monetary management in Ghana has been a simple 
process, involving the determination of a credit target and its allocation to different sectors 
of the economy, in line with overall macroeconomic objectives. Specifically, GDP growth, 
inflation and balance of payments targets are prepared; an income velocity of money is 
assumed; and the appropriate general expansion in domestic credit is derived. This credit 
target is then distributed among the commercial banks as a credit ceiling (Younger; 1991; 
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Youngblood et. al., 1992). As a result credit targets are easily achieved. Nevertheless, 
the targets may have either little or undesirable impact on real economic variables. 
Issues, objectives and structure of the paper 
The most important questions to answer in monetary management are: How large should 
be the money supply? What factors should be considered in deciding on the growth in 
money supply that will be consistent with growth in the GDP? Can monetary policy 
achieve the joint goal of growth/development and stability? Should M l be the target 
variable or M2? What instruments should be used to control monetary targets? In order 
to address these questions we need to provide a theoretical framework within which to 
operate. In subsequent sections we attempt to unravel some of these issues from both the 
theoretical perspective and empirical analysis. 
For now, however, it should be noted that quasi-money in Ghana is composed of over 
75% savings and less than 25% fixed time deposits including certificates in the primary 
commercial banks. In the secondary banks, however, for the period 1983-1991, the 
quasi-money comprises 57.6% of time deposits and 42.4% savings deposits. For both 
the primary commercial and secondary banks, quasi-money is about 60% savings deposits 
and about 40% fixed time (monetary) deposits. In this respect, for the primary commercial 
banks either M l or the base money may be a proper target. However, for the secondary 
banks it is not clear whether M l or M2 is the more appropriate monetary variable to 
target. It is important to note that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) usually targets 
M2. 
The objective of the paper, therefore, is to propose a financial programming framework 
that uses the technique of targets and indicators to assist the monetary authority in 
conducting policy to achieve its macroeconomic goals. The proposed programming 
framework will be based on the absorptive capacity of the economy, which will be 
endogenously determined; the institutionalization of indirect measures of control of 
ultimate targets using operating and intermediate instruments; open market operation; 
and moral suasion. Section II of the paper outlines targeting requirements and options. 
This is followed in Section III with some stylized facts of the monetary management 
process in Ghana during the adjustment era. Section IV gives our proposed targeting 
framework and Section V deals with implementation and methodology. Next are sections 
VI and VII, which discuss the use of money demand and supply, respectively, in 
establishing liquidity targets. The paper concludes with remarks and policy 
recommendations. 
II. Targeting requirements and options 
Monetary targeting, as indicated earlier, is an attempt to describe how the optimum 
monetary policy can be pursued to achieve macroeconomic objectives. An important 
requirement of the exercise, which has been a source of argument among economists, is 
the identification of appropriate intermediate targets, operating targets and/or policy 
instruments. An ideal operating target or policy instrument is one that can be precisely 
measured, is achievable by the monetary authority within a short period of time, serves 
as a visible signal regarding intent of policy to economic agents in the financial market 
and is related to intermediate targets. 
The choice of intermediate target is often between money stock and interest rates. 
Interest rate is the preferred target when the money demand function is unstable; otherwise 
money stock is considered the appropriate intermediate target (Poole, 1971). Whatever 
target variable is used for policy purposes must satisfy three criteria: measurability (so 
that its impact can be correctly ascertained), controllability (so that the central bank can 
exercise an effective control over it) and predictability (so that the monetary authority 
can anticipate the effect of the target variable on its objectives. 
With the various criteria to be satisfied defined, the next key issue is the options 
available for targeting growth in money supply - either by rule or discretion. If by rule, 
then the question is: How is the growth rate to be determined? If by discretion, What 
variables are to be "aimed for" supposing the desired target is pushed off track by non-
policy variables? The options are addressed below. 
From the monetary base and multiplier perspective, a central bank can change the 
level of money supply by changing either the multiplier or the base money. The key 
elements in the base money are reserves and currency with the non-bank public. But the 
basic assumption is that the monetary multiplier is stable and predictable. In the case of 
Ghana, the empirical evidence is that the multiplier (and particularly the currency-deposit 
ratio) is not stable. (Refer to Table 1). The main reason for the instability over the period 
in question was the increased currency with the non-bank public and the decrease in the 
volume of deposits due to imposed credit ceiling. This point will be discussed in more 
detail in Section III. 
Targeting of money supply from the assets perspective requires the decomposition of 
the money supply into net foreign assets (NFA), revaluation account (RVA), special 
drawing rights (SDR) allocation and net domestic assets (NDA). The NDA is in turn 
decomposable into net credit to government, cocoa financing, credit to the rest of the 
economy and other net assets. The basic assumption of this mode of targeting has been 
that the velocity of money was constant in the monetary/financial programming module. 
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Table 1: Multiplier and currency ratio 
Year Multiplier Currency-deposit ratio 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1.91 
1.90 
1.91 
2.09 
2.13 
2.13 
2.08 
2.48 
2.63 
0.75 
0.65 
0.65 
0.57 
0.54 
0.52 
0.53 
0.39 
0.41 1991 Q1 
Source: Youngblood et al. (1992), based on Bank of Ghana data. 
In order to decide on the actual level of (or alternatively the growth rate in) money 
supply, we must have an idea of the key missing link, the "velocity". Velocity may be 
assumed, but an incorrect assumption can create serious economic problems. We have 
to estimate it from the money demand (or the liabilities side of the monetary framework). 
Technically speaking, velocity (the GDP-M2 ratio) is found after the process has ended. 
However, its (marginal) average over a given period can be deduced from the money 
demand function, which then should constitute the basis of an increase in money supply 
for the ensuing year, which in turn must be the basis of the quarterly targets within the 
year. 
Alternatively, the decision on how much money should grow may be derived from 
the monetary growth rule based on the absorptive capacity of the economy. This solves 
the problem of exogenous imposition of a constant velocity. It introduces the degree of 
financial intermediation (DOFI) up front and also anchors expected price inflation at the 
same time. However, it is important to note that because the DOFI is the average for a 
given period, comparison of the actual DOFI for each period and for different countries 
(especially of similar economic features) can provide a clue as to the behaviour of the 
velocity. By way of example, Ghana's monetary velocity for 1991 was 7.52 times (inverse 
of 13.3%) and by our money demand function (1970-1992), the velocity at the margin 
averages 4.40 times (inverse of 22.73%). If the 4.40 is the "true" velocity and the financial 
programming assumes/uses 7.52, then it should be noted that we are reducing the liquidity 
requirement of the economy by over 3.12 times. This definitely would reduce the real 
growth in GDP via the expenditure flow including investment and manufacturing/ 
processing for export. 
III. Stylized facts about monetary 
management in Ghana during the 
adjustment era 
The goal of financial sector reform in Ghana is to discontinue the system of direct credit 
controls and initiate a process of indirect monetary control in which financial institutions 
are at liberty to make decisions on purely economic criteria, subject only to the requirement 
of sound banking practice and overall control of the money supply by the Bank of Ghana. 
This means that the Bank of Ghana will have to control the money supply through open-
market operations, adjusting banks' reserves through the emerging money markets for 
short-term Bank of Ghana bills. The way is now open for the monetary authority to 
pursue monetary policy by managing policy instruments to bring about certain changes 
in intermediate targets and, consequently, in ultimate targets. 
Monetary targets 
During the era of the economic reform programme in Ghana the projection of monetary 
targets, as indicated earlier, was based on an "assumed" velocity that was exogenously 
determined. With the velocity established, the assets side of the monetary programme 
was formulated as follows:1 
M2 
NDA 
Where 
M2 
NFA 
NDA 
NFA + NDA + RVA - SDRA (1) 
CGT + COC + CRE + ONA (2) 
nominal money stock, broad definition 
net foreign assets (nominal terms) defined as the difference 
between foreign assets (FA) and liabilities (FL), comprising NFA 
of banking system, net IMF position, post 1972 payment arrears, 
pre 1972 payment arrears and participation arrears 
net domestic assets defined as the sum of total credits 
to government, cocoa financing, credit to the rest of economy 
and net other assets 
RVA revaluation losses/account 
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SDRA special drawing rights allocation 
CGT total credit to government (nominal terms) defined as the 
sum of net claims on government and claims on public entities 
c o c cocoa financing (nominal terms) 
CRE credit to the rest of economy (nominal terms) 
ONA = other assets (net) 
The liabilities aspects were left unprogrammed as illustrated by Ghana's monetary 
programme in December 1990. (Refer to Table 2). Thus what happened to currency (or 
MO), demand, saving and time deposits did not matter directly. Besides, the exchange 
rates were assumed to be constant at 0303:$1. In the same financial programme there 
was provision for revaluation loss, but a revaluation loss should be consequent upon 
exchange rate depreciation. When we removed the NFA-exchange rate inconsistency 
and used 0330:$ 1 which was consistent with the underlying revaluation losses, the NFA 
targets fell from negative 0103.1 billion to negative 0112.3 billion for end-June 1990, 
from negative 0101.8 billion to negative 0110.9 billion for end-September 1990 and 
from negative 090.2 billion to negative 098.2 billion for end-December 1990 (Dordunoo, 
1990). This implies that for consistency the NDA should be higher than programmed. 
The most disturbing issue about the programme was how the GDP target was 
established. This was most obscure. But it is on the GDP that the velocity was anchored 
in the programme. The end-December 1991 velocity was programmed to be 7.9 times 
from a historical velocity of 7.3 times for end-December 1990. The question is: What is 
the basis of the anticipated acceleration in the transactions velocity when in the same 
programme inflation was projected to decelerate? We shall visit this again later. 
In order to attain the targets (the above as examples), two main instruments were 
used: reserve requirements and direct quantitative ceilings on domestic credit creation 
by the banking system. There were modifications during the period, though. The credit 
policies prior to February 1988 required all banks to channel specific percentages of 
their total credit to sectors of the economy in line with the development priorities of the 
government, taking into account the real growth rates projected as well as expected rates 
of inflation. This policy was changed as banks continued to lend to the commerce sector 
at the expense of industry and agriculture. Thus, in 1982, the BOG made it mandatory 
that a minimum of 20% of each bank's credit creation should be allotted to the agricultural 
sector. By 1988, however, all sectoral lending targets had been removed except for 
agriculture, which was abolished in 1990 (Sowa, 1991). 
GHANA: MONETARY TARGETING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Table 2: Ghana monetary programme, 1989-19911 
7 
In billion cedis Sep-90 Sep-90 Dec-90 Mar-91 Jun-91 Sep-91 Dec-9 
end-period data Prog Act Prog Prog Prog Prog Prog 
Net foreign assets 2/ -101.8 -64.7 -90.2 -85.7 -78.1 -72.1 -69.0 
Bank of Ghana2/ -145.8 -111.0 -134.2 -129.7 -122.1 -116.1 -113.0 
Deposit money banks2/ 44.0 46.3 44.0 44.0 44.0 44.0 44.0 
Net domestic assets 330.6 318.4 359.1 359.2 360.6 338.9 377.0 
Net credit to government 265.1 263.8 257.9 247.9 237.9 232.9 221.0 
of which excl rev losses -8.4 -9.7 -15.7 -25.7 -35.7 -40.7 -52.5 
Cocoa board financing (gross) 0.0 0.0 29.7 26.0 15.0 0.0 35.6 
Credit to rest of economy 96.4 104.9 109.9 117.1 124.9 133.2 142.2 
of which "sound" credit 49.9 58.4 63.4 69.0 75.0 81.6 88.8 
Other items, net -30.9 -50.2 -38.4 -31.8 -17.2 -27.3 -21.9 
Revaluation account 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 
Broad money (M2) 220.4 245.2 260.4 265.0 274.0 258.3 299.4 
Narrow money (M1) 185.4 
Currency (MO) 
Demand deposit 
Quasi money 59.9 
Saving deposit 
Time deposit 
SDR allocation 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 
Nominal GDP 1892.1 2361.4 
Velocity of circulation 
GDP/end-period (M2) 7.3 7.9 
Source: IMF and Bank of Ghana. 
1 Based on the new NFA of the Bank of Ghana and GCB, and including the discount house since 1 Jan 1989. 
This is only part of the financial programme. The full survey starts from Dec 89. 
2 Data on the NFA during 1990 and beyond are based on end 1989 exchange rates. 
Credit ceilings 
Since late 1990 there has been a shift to domestic credit limit in line with real GDP 
growth rates and inflation targets stipulated in the monetary survey. This mode of global 
targeting on the net domestic assets of the banking system was accomplished by bank-
specific credit ceilings based on five main considerations: deposit mobilization, actual 
use of bank deposits, recovery rate of new loans created, across the board credit allocation 
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and, finally, a safety valve consideration.2 The first credit ceiling criterion was based on 
deposit liabilities mobilized by the bank in question; in this case 50% of the ceiling was 
based on deposits mobilized by the bank. The second criterion considers how active a 
bank was; thus 20% of the bank-specific credit was based on actual use of the bank 
deposits. 
Third, the recovery rate of loans influenced the credit ceiling; 20% of the ceiling was 
based on the amount of new loans recovered in each quarter. The fourth criterion enjoined 
the BOG to give 10% (of the global credit to be created) across the board irrespective of 
the size of the DMBs. The last consideration designated as safety valve may be about 
20% of the total domestic credit to be created; this percentage was taken from the global 
credit prior to the distribution along the criteria listed above. Of course, there were other 
considerations, such as the performance of the net foreign assets (NFA), which also 
affects the liquidity position of the economy. Similarly, credit for cocoa financing also 
exerted its own influence in determining the level of credit that could be created in the 
rest of the economy. In summary, the ceilings that were specified in the form of bank-
specific ceilings on credit and other assets of the banking system initially also specified 
sectoral credit ceilings. The sectoral credit ceilings were removed later. Apart from these 
instruments, discount rates on treasury bills, as well as deposit and lending rates, were 
administratively determined by the Bank of Ghana. In addition to the removal of the 
sectoral credit ceilings, a weekly auction for treasury bills was introduced in order to 
determine the discount rate. This mode of monetary management, particularly the credit 
ceiling, led to unfortunate developments in the economy that we now consider. 
Credit ceilings could achieve the desirable objective of stabilization if adopted for a 
short period of time. Besides, it may be conceded that the use of credit ceilings to achieve 
monetary targets was due to the ease with which they could be administered and their 
effectiveness in controlling domestic credit. However, because the ceilings were imposed 
for a long period of time, they created serious distortions. First, they made redundant the 
use of reserve ratio as an instrument of monetary and credit management, leading to 
excess reserve holdings. Second, lending interest rates of commercial banks were 
increased and deposit rates were kept low, resulting in a widening of the spread. Third, 
they led to an increase in currency with the non-bank public and discouraged deposit 
mobilization. Fourth, they reduced the M2-GDP ratio or the degree of financial 
intermediation. Additionally, credit ceilings discourage competition among banks since 
the banks have little or no incentive to compete for new deposits if they are up against 
their ceiling. Further, they have strong incentives to compete for favours (in the form of 
higher ceilings) from the monetary authorities. We now take these in turn.3 
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Excess reserves coexisting with excess 
demand for credit 
Because of the draconian credit ceilings the banks were unable to lend all the resources 
mobilized. (Nor could the resources be invested in other lucrative investment 
opportunities.) The most important development that led to extra excess reserves was 
the drastic retirement of government domestic debt and the sharp fall in the government's 
reliance on the banking system to finance budget deficits. As can be seen in Table 3, the 
actual and the required cash and secondary ratios from 1983 to 1991 revealed positive 
excess reserves reaching as high as 25% in 1986; thereafter they declined to 7%, only to 
rise again to 19% in 1991. Surprisingly, the excess reserves in the banking system coexisted 
with an unsatisfied excess demand for credits by business firms. 
The direct impact on the deposit money banks was to dampen their resources 
mobilization efforts. It has been alleged that some banks were turning away potential 
savers, a practice that was extremely unhealthy for savings in the economy. This should 
not be surprising based on the reserves position of the deposit money banks due to the 
credit ceiling. 
In order to mop up the excess liquidity in the banking system, the central bank 
introduced Bank of Ghana bills. Despite the fact that the open market sales of the financial 
papers affected the monetary base and also caused changes in the monetary multiplier, 
they have not reduced the excess reserves of the banks. It is important to note that the 
yields on the instruments were so high that the willingness of the banks to hold them 
increased drastically to the detriment of credit to the private sector, thereby squeezing 
further the credit requirements for private sector development. 
Widening spread between deposit and lending rates 
Because of the credit constraint on the DMBs, banks had loaded their lending rates to 
cover operational costs and maintain profitability, thereby increasing the effective cost 
of credit. The higher lending rates vis-a-vis low deposit rates drastically discouraged 
financial intermediation. Additionally, the DMBs revealed stronger preference for demand 
deposits as against saving and time deposits. Thus while time deposits amounted to 
about 016.3 billion by end December 1988, by March 1990 this had fallen to less than 
09.91 billion. For the same period, despite the fact that lending rates had been around 
34.4%, time deposit rates ranged between 9.0% and 15.0%. There was evidence adduced 
to the fact that some banks were paying as low as 6.0% per annum. All this vividly 
illustrates the lack of competition among the DMBs due mainly to the credit ceilings 
imposed. With reserve requirements as high as 57%, the wide spreads also resulted in an 
indirect control system and therefore impair the credit creation potential of the deposit 
money banks. 
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Table 3: Required, actual and excess reserve holdings, 1983-1991 
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 199 
Cash ratio (%) 
Required 24 10 13 8 22 20 22 22 22 
Actual 29 26 25 25 25 23 28 30 28 
Excess 5 16 11 17 4 3 6 8 6 
Secondary ratio (%) 
Required 28 35 27 15 7 10 15 20 20 
Actual 44 32 27 22 15 17 16 29 34 
Excess 16 -3 0 7 8 7 1 9 14 
Totals (%) 
Required 52 45 40 23 28 30 37 42 42 
Actual 73 58 51 48 40 40 45 59 61 
Excess 21 13 11 25 12 10 7 17 19 
Secondary reserves 8400 11733 12016 17457 23817 55738 71560 
Bank of Ghana bills 26461 45231 
Cocoa bills 0 4319 293 13178 10947 
Treasury bills 1987 2731 3355 1700 538 0 0 
Government stocks 6126 8195 7117 6457 5819 2948 2893 
Subtotal 8113 10926 10476 12476 6650 42587 59071 
Source: Bank of Ghana. 
High proportion of currency with non-bank public 
The lack of active mobilization of resources by the DMBs, coupled with very low deposit 
rates, resulted in the build up of liquidity outside the banks. This was reflected in a high 
proportion of currency with the non-bank public, i.e., MO, which remained above 50% 
of M l . (Refer to Table 4). 
The immediate impact of an increase in currency with the non-bank public (MO) was 
a corresponding increased demand for goods and services, which in turn exerted 
inflationary pressures as well as increased depreciation of the cedi in the foreign exchange 
market. The rapid depreciation of the cedi emanates from two demand pressures 
consequent upon increased liquidity outside the banks: demand for foreign exchange as 
a hedge against the continuing depreciation of the cedi and demand for the import of 
goods. All this in turn jointly exerts pressures on the exchange rates and the current 
account balance, which had remained negative over the ERP era. 
An important irony emerges: we imposed credit ceilings to reduce inflationary 
pressures, but in the process, we have increased liquidity outside the banking system, 
which in turn exerted the inflationary pressures we sought to prevent. We need a new and 
better financial management framework. 
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Table 4: Money supply (M1) and its components (million cedis) 
End of 
period 
Currency with 
non-bank 
public 
(1) 
Demand 
deposits with 
banks 
Money 
supply 
(2) 3 = 1 + 2 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
10033.9 
12422.3 
17241.2 
31240.2 
46116.5 
65036.9 
82916.7 
80044.7 
90030.1 
6377.1 
14947.7 
26708.8 
34575.5 
48925.5 
73944.1 
102236.4 
136913.4 
139160.0 
16411.0 
27370.0 
43950.0 
65815.7 
95042.0 
139031.0 
185153.1 
216958.1 
229190.1 
Sources Quarte rly Economic Bulletin, Bank of Ghana. 
Ghana: Progress on Adjustment, World Bank. 
The follow-up effect of inability of the MDBs to mobilize deposits further not only 
results in a shift out of deposits to cash but also reduces the overall supply of money 
leading to financial squeeze. This may reduce inflation in the short run. In the medium 
term, however, the financial squeeze leads to contraction of economic activity. 
Declining financial intermediation (M2-GDP ratio) 
It is pertinent to note that policies of an excessively tight monetary control and credit 
squeeze adopted during the era of the ERP led to a steady reduction in broad money or 
M2-GDP ratio, from over 18% in 1986 to as low as 13% in 1991, reflecting an extremely 
weak degree of financial intermediation and its adverse effect on productive economic 
activities. Ghana's M2-GDP ratio was more than 29% in 1976, but declined rapidly in 
the wake of the ERP, all in a bid for demand management and exchange rate stability. 
During the ERP era it has been domestic credit, especially credit to the rest of the economy 
(and particularly the industrial sector), that suffered most. 
Comparable figures for 1961-1991 of selected countries that have registered rapid 
development in recent times are reported in Table 5. It is important to note that inflation 
decelerated with a reduction in money supply but not as fast as desirable; nevertheless, 
growth hardly exceeded 5% per annum. On the other hand, the countries mentioned in 
Table 5 recorded faster deceleration in inflation hand in hand with a growth rate above 
8% to 10% per annum, while their M2-GDP ratios are all far higher than Ghana's. The 
estimate for Thailand was 78.4% for 1991 from 75% in 1990. This seems to suggest that 
as the degree of intermediation rises, the rate of inflation tends to decelerate. 
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Table 5: Financial intermediation of selected countries 
(measured by M2-GDP ratio, percentages) 
CountryVYear 1961 1976 1990 1991 
Ghana 19.0 29.2 15.0 13.3 
Indonesia 9.0* 17.1 35.0* 39.1 + 
Korea 14.0 30.0 40.0 45.8+ 
Malaysia 26.0 45.5 68.0 72.3+ 
Thailand 24.0 36.3 75.0 78.4+ 
Sources: World Bank (1992), IFS 1991 Yearbook and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
"Indonesia data are for 1969 and 1989. 
+Provisional estimates. 
IV. A proposed monetary targeting framework 
Any realistic monetary programme must address both the demand for and the supply of 
money.4 The sources of money supply must be clearly identified. The four main sources 
of broad monetary stock (M2) are net foreign assets (NFA), net domestic assets (NDA), 
revaluation account (RVA) less special drawing rights allocation (SDRA) as stated in 
Equation 1. In Equation 2 net domestic assets is defined as the sum of total credit to 
government (CGT), cocoa financing (COC), and credit to the rest of the economy (CRE) 
plus or minus other net assets (ONA). 
.For ease of reference, we reproduce equations 1 and 2 from the previous section as 
follows: 
M2 = NFA + NDA + RVA - SDRA (1) 
NDA = CGT + COC + CRE + ONA (2) 
From Equation 2, the NDA of the economy has three main elements. This definition 
can be redecomposed into two major parts: the NDA of the Bank of Ghana and that of 
the commercial banks or the deposit money banks (DMBs). That is: 
NDA = NDABQC + NDADMB ( 3 ) 
It is vital to note that the net domestic assets of the Bank of Ghana and those of the 
DMBs are closely related. This means that an active indirect management of the NDAB0C 
through open market operations will largely influence the NDADMB, In order to establish 
the strong linkage between the two domestic assets we expose the composition of the 
NDA of BOG and the NDA of the DMBs. 
Following Equation 2, the net domestic assets of the central bank may be defined 
as follows: 
NDAB0G = NCDMBB0G + NCGb0G + cocBOG + CREbog + ONABOG (4) 
Where 
NDAONR, = net domestic assets of the Bank of Ghana BO O 
NCDMBB0G = net claims by the deposit money banks on Bank of Ghana 
NCGBOG = net credit to government by BOG 
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= cocoa financing by Bank of Ghana 
= Bank of Ghana's claims on the rest of the economy 
= other items (net) claims on BOG 
Similarly, the net domestic assets of the deposit money banks (NDA ) may be defined 
as follows: 
NDAOMB = NCGDMB + CREDMB + ONADMB 
Where 
N D A O M S = net domestic assets of the DMBs 
N C G » M B = 
net credit to government by DMBs 
CREDMB = 
credit to the rest of the economy by DMBs 
ONADMB = other items (net) claims on DMBs 
COC.OG 
CREBOG 
ONABOG 
From the perspective of deposit liabilities of commercial banks it is instructive to 
note that the NDA of the DMBs is the difference between their total deposit liabilities 
(DLDMB) on the one hand and the sum of net credit by the BOG (NCDMB ) and the net 
foreign assets of the DMBs (NFADMB), i.e: 
NDADMB = DLMA - (NCDMBB0G + NFADJ (6) 
Thus in equilibrium, in view of equations 5 and 6, we have: 
NCGDMB + CREDMB + ONADMB = DLDMB - (NCDMBB0G + NFADJ ( 6 . 1 ) 
It is important to note that the total deposit liabilities comprise demand (DD), saving 
(DS) and time deposits (DT), i.e., 
DLDMB = DD + DS + DT ( 6 .2 ) 
The definitions in Equations 4 and 6 imply that the net claims of the DMBs on the 
BOG, a component of the NDAG0G, is a component of NDAOM. Therefore, a change in 
the NDAB0G due to a change in NCDMBB0G will definitely influence the NDADUB. Also, 
changes in the components of DLDMB are influenced mainly by deposit interest rates even 
though the final decision taker is the private individual. Thus changes in all these variables 
— deposit liabilities and the net claims of DMBs - are crucial to the monetary authority. 
We are, therefore, keenly interested in the components of the net claims of DMBs on 
the BOG. These include cash reserves, secondary reserves and holdings of BOG 
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instruments: 
NCDMB 
BOG CASHR + SRES + INST, BOG (7) 
r.DL, DMB 
Where 
CASHR cash reserves 
SRES 
INST, BOG 
secondary reserves 
instruments of Bank of Ghana 
r cash reserve ratio 
r secondary reserve ratio 
In view of Equation 7, it is possible for the central bank to influence the level of 
NDADMB by controlling one or all of the three components, cash reserve ratio, secondary 
reserve ratio and the yield rate on the BOG instruments, which in turn will influence 
decisions by DMBs to buy and/or sell BOG instruments. The purchase and/or sale of 
instruments to commercial banks (and the public at large) is to achieve the desired target 
of claims of commercial banks consistent with the NDA target. Instruments should be 
sold in order to reduce liquidity if NDA exceeds the target; instruments should be bought 
back in order to inject liquidity into the system if NDA is below target. Supposing that 
the portfolio preferences of DMBs are such that they are unwilling to buy instruments 
floated by the BOG; then the central bank may use moral suasion (arm twisting) or vary 
the reserve requirements by changing the cash and secondary reserve ratios to achieve 
its monetary policy objectives. 
V. Implementation and proposed methodology 
Establishing the monetary targets 
In the previous section we proposed the theoretical basis of a monetary targeting 
framework. The implementation of such a scheme requires establishing how much money 
should grow to be consistent with the absorptive capacity of the economy to ensure 
growth and development. This will be accomplished using a money demand function. 
Thus the first stage is to estimate a money demand function and derive the absorptive 
capacity of the economy. This is addressed in Section VI. 
The second stage requires the targeting of the main components of money supply 
from both the assets side (such as reported in the analytical frame) and the liabilities side 
(i.e., demand, time and saving deposits, and currency with the non-bank public) that 
must be consistent with the demand for money, bearing in mind the projected growth in 
real GDP and price inflation rates, among other important factors that affect these variables. 
The behavioural functions of all the components must be specified and estimated and 
then used to forecast their targets. Third, after forecasting all the components of the 
assets side and all the components of the liabilities side (particularly the deposit liabilities 
of the DMBs), we should establish the targets that must be attained in the following year. 
All the targets are then reconciled with the money demand determined targets. This is 
addressed in Section VII. 
Fourth, the monthly and quarterly frequencies are then isolated for close monitoring 
using the behavioural pattern of the economy such as time for cocoa purchases, retirement 
of domestic debt by government, "sound" and "non-performing" credits to the rest of the 
economy, time of receipts from exports and payment for imports, etc. Other important 
influences that must be brought to inform the programming include a thorough 
understanding of the money market and the lag structure of the response of instruments 
to policy announcement and enactment. 
Achieving the targets 
After having established the appropriate frequencies and the corresponding targets, the 
monitoring of the whole economy and the supervision of the banking system become 
paramount. The most important indicator is price development. Also important are such 
leading indicators (used in establishing the targets) as the time for increase in liquidity 
due to cocoa purchases, business and commercial consumption of electricity and petrol/ 
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gas, the sale of minerals (such as gold and diamond) and timber, etc. On the fiscal side, 
major revenue items and expenditure items should also be monitored. 
The returns by all DMBs and consolidated discount houses (CDHs) must be submitted 
to the OMO committee to ensure evaluation of developments against targets and in order 
to reduce policy execution lags that may occur. Besides, efforts must be afoot to identify 
the factors responsible for the monetary aggregates getting "off track", as well as the 
time lag between the changes in the instruments and the intermediate variables that have 
to be changed. The BOG must be free to review and/or change monetary policy as and 
when it becomes necessary, taking into consideration the crucial lags. 
The four major lags to be carefully identified and used in achieving policy objectives 
are: 
• Policy (need-effect) time lag - the interval of time between a need for a counter-
cyclical policy action and the actual effect of that policy action on an economic 
variable. 
• Recognition lag -the interval between the time that the need for a counter-cyclical 
action arises and the time this need is recognized by a policy maker. This applies, for 
example, to a price increase that may be recognized only when the PCPI data have 
been compiled, which takes weeks or even months to become available. 
• Implementation/response lag - the time between recognition of a need for a counter-
cyclical action and actual implementation of the policy action. For example, the 
OMO committee may have to engage in a discussion of the policy decision on the 
reserve ratios with the DMBs and the fiscal authorities. 
• Transmission lag - the time that elapses between implementation of an intended 
counter-cyclical policy and its ultimate effects on an economic variable. 
Data requirements and method of analysis 
The main objective of this study is to develop a computer-based monetary management 
framework using annual (which could be decomposed into quarterly and/or monthly) 
data. The behavioural equations are developed and simultaneously estimated using 
MICROFIT (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1995) and Micro TSP (Lilien, 1996). 
The main sources of the basic data series (not necessarily the data transformations) 
are the various issues of the Quarterly Digest of Statistics (QDS) of the Ghana Statistical 
Service in Ghana: Progress on Adjustment, April 1991, of the World Bank; and the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is 
crucial to note that almost all the data series have been drastically revised by the Ghana 
Statistical Service in the QDS Vol. XI No. 2 of June 1993 as well as their preliminary 
estimates of the 1992 statistics. The time series data used in the estimation of the model 
were based on the official position. We did not incorporate the updated series because 
from June 1994 and beyond they are only preliminary estimates. In the case of the IFS 
we used the data as contained in the 1988 to 1994 Yearbooks. The data used for estimating 
the model can be obtained upon request from the authors. 
VI. Establishing the monetary target: money 
demand 
A theoretical framework 
The first stage of our proposed framework is the estimation of the money demand function. 
In order to evaluate which function will perform best in predicting the desirable monetary 
stock in the economy we will experiment with money demand functions for both structural 
stability and predictability. The equations are: 
M2D = M(Y, R, DPe, ..); > 0, Mr M}<0 
MID = M(Y, R, DPe, ..); M, > 0, M2, Ft<0 
Where 
M2D = M2 = money demand, broad definition, (real terms, 1975 prices) 
M I D = Ml = money demand, narrow definition (real terms, 1975 prices) 
Y = real gross domestic product (1975 prices) 
R = vector of interest rates to be experimented with 
DR = interest rate (bank rate); RD = deposit interest rate 
RL = lending interest rate 
D P = DPGDP = expected inflation rate captured by a change in GDP price 
deflator (1975 = 100), or a change in PCPI = consumer price 
index (1975 = 100) 
The equations (D1) and (D11) are specifications of money demand functions for broad 
and narrow definitions, respectively. Each of them shows positive dependence on income 
(as "scale" variable) for transactions balances and negative dependence on expected 
inflation and interest rate (an "opportunity cost" variable) for speculative balances. Both 
the "scale" and "opportunity cost" variables are pertinent macroeconomic variables that 
are relevant for decision making by demanders of money. In this respect, while the scale 
variable relates the money stock to the transactions to be financed, the opportunity cost 
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variable relates the holdings of money to the attractiveness of other assets such as Bank 
of Ghana bonds, Government of Ghana treasury bills, cocoa bills, revaluation loss 
consoles, non-performing assets recovery trust (NPART) bonds, and shares and stocks 
on the Ghana Stock Exchange Market (GSEM). 
Other variables we shall experiment with include GNP as against GDP; the real 
exchange rate will be introduced as an argument to capture currency substitution. We 
shall also experiment with nominal and real interest rates and the logarithmic 
transformation of one plus interest rate (i.e., 1 + r). Apart from using the inflation rate as 
an argument we intend to normalize the rate of inflation by obtaining [inflation/ 
(1-t-inflation)]. 
In the money demand function we have to deflate the nominal money stock with the 
general price level. A relevant theoretical and practical issue of concern is the choice of 
the appropriate measure of price level to be used as a deflator for the nominal cash 
balances. In the case of real demand for money the appropriate deflator is the PGDP. 
However, given that inflation is a measure of opportunity cost for holding money, then 
the relevant price level variable should be the consumer price index (PCPI) or the 
wholesale price index (PWPI). We will experiment with all these price variables in the 
estimation of our behaviourial relations. 
A logarithmic form of a money demand function that is appropriate for the derivation 
of the absorptive capacity of the economy is as follows: 
LnM2 = Co+C1LnY-C2 Dlnp + C( LnM2 ; 
LnMl = C + C. LnY - C. Dlnp + C, LnMl , o 1 2 J -l 
(D2) 
(D21) 
Where 
LnM2 = natural log of broad money (M2) 
Ci = ith parameter to be estimated 
LnY - natural log of real GDP 
Dlnp = first difference of the natural log of price level (or inflation rate) 
The guiding rule is that the quantum increase in money stock consistent with the 
absorptive capacity of the economy should be equal to the product of income elasticity 
and growth rate in nominal GDP less the product of the price elasticity and price inflation 
plus a small amount of inflation conducive for good business. Symbolically, this monetary 
rale is: 
= + (D2-) 
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Where 
miz = projected growth rate of nominal money (i = 1,2) 
yz = growth rate of nominal GDP 
P.+i = projected (price) inflation rate 
c , = income elasticity of real money demand 
C2 = inflation price elasticity of real money demand 
SM = small amount of projected inflation rate conducive for good business 
The monetary rale in equations (D2*) and (D2*1) will settle a basic bone of contention 
in monetary management approaches between the Bank of Ghana (BOG) and the IMF. 
While the BOG will advocate for targeting narrow monetary growth, IMF will rather 
prefer targeting broad monetary growth. Additionally, this monetary rale will provide a 
check on the internal consistency of projections on the narrow money growth captured 
by the real money demand equation and the projections from real quasi money based on 
the quasi-money equation. In principle the level of broad real money balances must 
equal the narrow money balances plus real quasi money. In the equations above prices 
and GDP may be exogenous or endogenous. We will determine them from the government 
policy framework paper, which normally states the macroeconomic targets the government 
wishes to achieve in the ensuing year. Or, we may determine them using a production 
function and price function, respectively, in a macroeconometric model of Ghana 
(Dordunoo, 1995b, 1994b). 
Empirical results 
We have reported four equations. The best result of money demand function estimated 
for the period 1970 - 1992 is Equation EDl b reported in Table 6, after which we derive 
the growth target that will be consistent with the inflation rate and the real GDP growth 
rate. We, however, reported the results of both equations EDl a and EDlb . The t's are in 
brackets. In terms of the performance of the equations, it seems that targeting M2 will 
yield fewer forecast errors (as the mean absolute percentage errors are smaller) than 
those in the Ml equations. The M l equations are not reported because of the high 
simulation errors. 
The econometric results reveal that real GDP is a better explanatory variable than 
GNP. A possible explanation is that while non-Ghanaians resident in Ghana demand 
cedi for transactions, Ghanaians resident abroad do not demand cedi for their transactions 
in the foreign countries in which they reside. For the exchange rate (ER) argument of 
currency substitution, the results show that not only is ER preceded by the wrong sign, 
its t is very low. 
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Table 6: Money demand regression equations 
2 1 
Money demand equation with a lag Lnm2 (OLS) 
ED1a. LNM2 0.2926 + 0.1444 LNY - 0.4364 DLNCPI -
(0.0714) (0.2371) (-1.8740) 
A-R2 0.6890 
F 12.6302 
DW 1.7768 
MAPE 10.6785% 
TIC 3.2678 
Money demand equation with a lag Lnm2 (C-O) 
ED1b. LNM2 -0.3752 + 0.2949 LNY - 0.4261 DLNCPI -
(-0.0776) (0.3777) (-1.6382) 
A-R2 0.6755 
F 9.3284 
DW 1.7882 
MAPE 10.3049% 
TIC 3.2101 
C-0 AR(1) CON = 6 Iterations 
Money demand equation without a lag 
ED2. LNM2 -4.5080 + 1.4081 LNY - 0.0838 LNCPI -1 
(-0.9887) (2.5795) (-1.6741 
A-R2 0.6443 
F 10.5097 
DW 1.8429 
MAPE 10.3176% 
TIC 3.2121 
C-O AR(1) CON = 4 Iterations 
Money demand equation with output and price arguments 
ED3. LNM2 -4.2336 + 1.3677 LNY - 0.09260 LNCPI 
JLMUI.TU.UITU l-.N.VUL, 
;-0.3046) (3.8964) 
(-0.4577) (2.3055) 
-0.2529) 
(-0.9912) (2.7175) (-2.8131) 
A-R2 = 0.6628 
F = 14.7590 
DW = 1.88733 
MAPE = 10.3366% 
TIC = 3.2151 
C-0 AR(1) CON = 4 Iterations 
The reason may be that for the period 1970-1992 the greater part of observations (1970-
1983) were characterized by fixed exchange rate. We adopted a split regression where 
the sample period 1983-1992 had been used for the regression, but the model was seriously 
constrained by a low degree of freedom. As far as the interest rate is concerned the 
logarithmic transformation of nominal interest rate performed relatively better than the 
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real interest rate; the log of (1 + r) performed least satisfactorily with wrong sign and low 
t. The inclusion of the inflation rate as a percentage change of CPI performed relatively 
better than the transformed version [inflation/(l+inflation)]. The results in which the 
above arguments reveal perverse results have not been reported. 
Equation ED1\ which uses a Cochrane-Orcutt method and contains lagged real money 
balances, is selected because it has satisfied all the a priori conditions (just as equation 
EDla). 
Even though the income and interest rate arguments are not significant, the overall 
performance of the equation is fairly strong, with an adjusted R2 of 0.68, and a mean 
absolute percentage error (MAPE) of 10.3. Interest rate is not significant because it has 
been mandatorily fixed over a very long period by the monetary authority. Its exclusion, 
however, has reduced the predictive power of the equation indicated by a higher MAPE. 
Equation ED2, which contains the interest rate performed less satisfactorily than equation 
ED3. However, equation ED3 could not be used as it may have biased upwards the 
income elasticity due to the omission of the inflation rate. The level of prices that has 
appeared on the two sides of the equation, denominator on the left and regressor on the 
right, constitutes a test of the imposition of homogeneity of money demand. Thus, for 
the purpose of determining the absorptive capacity of the economy we used equation 
EDlb . This equation has been selected because of its fairly high ability to track turning 
points over the historical period as well as its superior predictive power. 
It should be noted that in all the empirical regressions the left-hand side has real 
money supply, which in equilibrium is equal to the real money demand. Another important 
point to note is that these regressions may be criticized as revealing spurious correlations 
of trended variables in view of the large and convincing literature on "spurious" 
regressions. For practical purposes we use the traditional econometric methods. In a 
later study we shall use the cointegration technique to establish the extent to which the 
results would be used for financial programming and the preparations of monetary survey. 
Forecasting broad money demand target 
Supposing, for purposes of simulation exercise, we adopt an annual real GDP growth 
rate of 5% and inflation rate of 15% for 1993, an increase in the rate of interest of 1.68%, 
and an increase in nominal broad money of 31%; then, using an extended version of the 
relationship in Equation D2* the corresponding growth in broadly defined money stock 
for 1993 should be: 
M2z = (0.2949X20)-(0.4261)(15)-(0.0743)(1.68) +(0.7385)(31) 
= 28.7915-6.5163 
=, 22.2752% 
=>M2 = 22.2752 - 15 
= 7.2752% 
An alternative method of determining the growth rate of broad money is now addressed. 
For the purpose of comparsion, we may obtain the logarithmic level of M2 (LNM2) by 
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substituting the log levels of the real income, change in price level (DLNCPI), the log of 
interest rate (LNDR), and the lagged or predetermined value of real money balances 
(LNM2 j). The anti-log of the RHS gives the level positions. The simulation experiment 
of equation EDlb yields the following results: 
LNM293 = - 0.3752 + (0.2949 * 8.9710) - (0.4261 * 0.15) 
- (0.0743 * 3.5553) + (0.3752 * 7.1506) 
= - 0.3752 + 2.6455 - 0.0639 - 0.2642 + 5.2807 
= 7.9262 - 0.7033 
= 7.2229 
=> M293 = 1370.4576 
But LNM292 = 7.1506 
=> M292 = 1274.8706 
=> M2 = (1370.4576/1274.8706) - 1 
= 7.4978% 
=> M2z = 7.4978 + 15 
= 22.4978% 
The absorptive capacity and the full equation approach yield about the same growth 
rates in real money balances. We adopt the results of the second method. For a real GDP 
growth of 5% and an inflation rate of 15%, among other assumptions, real money balances 
should rise by not more than 7.5%. From our results, for the growth in nominal money to 
be consistent with the nominal GDP growth of 20% money supply must increase by 
22.5% in 1993. Alternatively stated, for a real GDP growth of 5%, real money should 
not increase by more than 7.5% if we are to avoid an acceleration in the rate of inflation. 
These growth rates must be considered as the upper limits for credit expansion. 
VII. Establishing the monetary target: money 
supply 
A theoretical model 
In order to present a theoretical model there is need to revisit some of the relationships 
and identities used in developing the monetary targeting framework in Section IV. The 
second level of consistency analysis, called intermediate targeting, requires the targeting 
of the main components of money supply from both the assets and the liabilities sides. 
The behavioural relations to be estimated and then used to forecast the sources of money, 
which are in turn reconciled with the demand for money, are given below. 
We first address the definitions and behaviourial assumptions. The four main sources of 
broad money stock (from the assets point of view) are net foreign assets, net domestic 
assets, revaluation account less special drawing rights allocation as stated in Equation 
S1. In Equation S2, net domestic assets is defined as the sum of total credit to government, 
cocoa financing, credit to the rest of the economy, plus or minus other net assets. 
On the liabilities side, money supply (broadly defined) is the sum of money supply 
(narrowly defined) and quasi money (sum of savings and time deposits) in Equation SI1. 
In Equation S3 narrow monetary stock is stated as the sum of currency with the non-
bank public and demand deposits.5 
Identities 
Sources of money (assets) 
M2Z = NFAZ + NDAZ + RVAZ - SDRAZ 
NDAZ = CGTZ + COCZ + CREZ + ONAZ 
Money supply (liabilities) 
(SI) 
(S2) 
M2Z = M1Z + MQUAZ (S3) 
M1Z = CUZ + DDZ (Sl . l ) 
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Behavioral relations 
Equations S4 to SI l 2 capture the behavioural relations to be estimated. Equation S4 
asserts that NFAZ is an increasing function of imports, short-term foreign debt, but a 
decreasing function of exchange rate and private unrequited transfers. In Equation S5, 
total credit to government is postulated as a function of total government expenditure 
(positively), total tax revenue (negatively), and D83TLR (negatively), which is expected 
to capture the impact of the trade liberalization in Ghana. The D83TLR argument is to 
reflect the resolute determination of the Government of Ghana to retire its domestic 
debts owed to the banking and the non-banking systems. 
Cocoa financing in Equation S6, as may be expected, depends positively on the volume 
of cocoa produced and exported, the exchange rate, and DB3TLR. The latter regressor 
is to capture the rapid increases in the producer price of cocoa offered to farmers to boost 
their morale. The cocoa farmer received 056,000 per ton in 1985, 085,000 in 1986, 
0140,000 in 1987, 0165,000 in 1988 and 0174,400 in 1989. This reflects the policy of 
the government to increase production of cocoa and to reward the farmers who had a 
terms of trade deterioration owing to the fixed exchange regime prior to 1983 (Dordunoo, 
1994a). 
The credit to the rest of the economy is postulated to be an increasing function of the 
exchange rate and deposit rate and income (YZ), but depends negatively on discount rate 
and net foreign assets as captured in Equation S7. The last argument is to capture whether 
or not NFAZ is crowding out CREZ. The normal response to the NFAZ (which has 
become the strongest driving force and source behind monetary expansion in Ghana) is 
a reduction in CREZ. Consequently, credits to manufacturing and agriculture have been 
declining while credit to the services sector, particularly retail and wholesale trade, has 
been on the increase. In symbols, equations S4 to S7 are as follows: 
NFAZ = F(BOPQZ, DBDSZ, ER, UNRTRPZ); Fp F2 > 0, F}, F4<0 (S4) 
CGTZ = F(GEZ, TZ, D83TLR); Fl > 0, Fy F}<0 (S5) 
COCZ = F(COV, ERZ, D83TL); F. > 0, i = 1, 2, 3 (S6) 
CREZ = F(ERZ, YZ, RD, DR, NFAZ); Fp F2, F, > 0, F4, Fs<0 (S7) 
In Equation S8 we have currency with the non-bank public determined by income 
(positively), discount rate (negatively) and dummy variable (D82PROB) to capture the 
effect of policies that reduced confidence in the banking system. The latter were the 
demonetization of 050 notes and freezing of bank deposits greater than 050,000 pending 
investigation for tax liability or fraud. Equation S9 makes demand deposit depend 
positively on income, degree of urbanization (and use of cheques) captured by urban 
population (POPU) and number of banks (NOB) to capture the effect of monetization, 
and negatively on D82PROB to capture the impact of the probe of bank customers in 
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1982 and 1983. Equation SIO postulates that quasi money depends on income, urban 
population, number of financial institutions and D82PROB with the same signs as in 
Equation S9. Equation S l l postulates that revaluation losses respond positively to 
exchange rate. 
cuz F(YZ, DR, D82PROB, DR, RD, RL); F, > 0, F , F3 <0 (S8) 
DDZ = D(YZ, POPU, NOB, D8, DR, RD, RL), DpDrD£Q,D4 <0 (S9) 
MQUAZ = F(YZ, POPU, NOB, D82), Fp F2, F}>0,F4<0 (SIO) 
RVAZ = F(ERZ); F'>0 (S l l ) 
Transformation/ratios/definitions 
In order for the system to execute the necessary transformation prior to the simulation 
exercise there is need to incorporate all the transformation/definitions and ratios required 
for the full solution of the model. These are presented as follows: 
ONAZ = NDAZ-CGTZ - COCZ- CREZ (SI 2) 
C2 CUZ/(DDZ + DTZ + DSZ) (S13) 
RRZ MRR * (DDZ + DTZ + DSZ) (SI 4) 
REZ (1-MRR) * (DDZ + DTZ + DSZ) (S15) 
CGTZ = NCGZ + CPEZ (SI 6) 
CREZ = CNBFZ + CPSZ (S17) 
NFAZ = FAZ - FLZ = BSZ + NIMFZ + P072PAZ + PR72PAZ + PAZ (SI8) 
MQUAZ = DSZ + DTZ (SI 9) 
Equilibrium condition 
The model closes with an equilibrium condition that requires the total money supplied to 
be equal to total money demanded as in Equation S20. 
M2ZS = M2ZD = M2Z (S20) 
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Variables in monetary/financial sector 
Endogenous variables 
M2Z = nominal money stock, broad definition 
NDAZ = net domestic assets defined as the sum of total credits to 
government, cocoa financing, credit to the rest of economy 
and net other assets 
M I Z = nominal money stock, narrow definition 
NFAZ = net foreign assets (nominal terms) defined as the difference 
between foreign assets (FAZ) and liabilities (FLZ), comprising 
NFAZ of banking system, net IMF position, post-1972 payment 
arrears, pre-1972 payment arrears and participation arrears 
CGTZ = total credit to government (nominal terms) defined as the sum 
of net claims on government and claims on public entities 
COCZ = cocoa financing (nominal terms) 
CREZ = credit to the rest of economy (nominal terms) 
CUZ = currency with non-bank public (nominal terms) 
DDZ = demand deposits (nominal terms) 
MQUAZ = quasi money comprising savings and time deposits 
V2 = monetary velocity, broad definition 
Predetermined variables 
RRZ = reserve requirements (nominal terms) 
REZ = excess reserve (nominal terms) 
DTSZ = total deposits comprising demand, savings and time 
deposits (nominal terms) 
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DTZ = time deposits (nominal) 
DSZ = savings deposits (nominal) 
YZ = nominal gross domestic product 
Y = real gross domestic product (1975 prices) 
DR = discount rate (bank rate) 
RD = deposit rate 
RL = lending rate 
D82PROB = D82 = dummy variable to capture 050 notes withdrawal policy 
and freezing of bank customers' accounts of more than 050,000 
pending investigation for tax liability or fraud in 1982 and 1983 
= 1 for 1982 and 1983 (or alternatively = 0 for 82 and 83) 
= 0 other years (or alternatively = 1 other years) 
POPU = urban population to capture the degree of urbanization 
(and use of cheques in transactions) 
NOB = number of money deposit banks (DMBs) 
BOPQZ = imports expenditure (nominal terms), balance 
of payments component 
DBDZ = total foreign debt (nominal terms) 
DBDLZ = long-term foreign debt (nominal terms) 
DBDMZ = medium-term foreign debt (nominal terms) 
DBDSZ = short-term foreign debt (nominal terms) 
GEZ = government expenditure (public finance component) 
(nominal terms) 
TZ = total tax revenue (nominal terms) 
UNRTRPZ = private unrequited transfers (nominal terms) 
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UNRTROZ - official unrequited transfers (nominal terms) 
D83TLR = D83TL = dummy variable to capture trade liberalization 
policy since 1983 
= 0 for 1970-1982 (no trade liberalization) 
= 1 for 1983-1988 (trade liberalization) (d83tlr is reversed d83tl) 
P = PGDP = expected price level captured by GDP price 
deflator (1975 = 100) 
PCPI = consumer price index (1975 = 100) 
C2 = currency total deposit ratio 
R2 = required reserve total deposit ratio 
R1 = required reserve demand deposit ratio 
E2 = excess reserve total deposit ratio 
El = excess reserve demand deposit ratio 
NCGZ = net credit to government (nominal terms) 
CPEZ = credit to public entities (nominal terms) 
FAZ = foreign assets (nominal terms) 
FLZ = foreign liabilities (nominal terms) 
BSZ = BSNFAZ = banking system NFAZ 
NIMFZ = net International Monetary Fund (IMF) position 
P072PAZ = post 1972 payment arrears 
PR72PAZ = pre 1972 payment arrears 
PAZ = participating arrears 
ERAZ = average exchange rate (: $ ratio) 
3 0 RESEARCH PAPER 7 7 
ERZ = exchange rate, end of year (: $ ratio) 
COV = volume of cocoa purchased and exported 
PCOZ = price of cocoa (nominal terms) 
RVAZ = revaluation account to capture exchange losses due to 
the depreciation of the Ghanaian cedi since 1983 
SDRAZ = special drawing rights allocation (nominal terms) 
MRR = minimum required reserve ratio 
ARR = actual returned reserve ratio 
WZ = WMINMTZ = wage rate (nominal terms) 
PX = price of exports (index, 1975 = 100) 
PQ = price of imports (index, 1975 = 100) 
PTOT = price terms of trade (PX:PQ ratio) 
BTOT = barter terms of trade (XINDEX:QINDEX ratio) 
XINDEX = exports volume (index, 1975 = 100) 
QINDEX = imports volume (index, 1975 = 100) 
RCOTOTD = real cost of terms of trade deterioration 
CUM2R = currency-money ratio (broad definition) 
Empirical results 
Table 7 presents the empirical results; this is followed by empirical determination of the 
supply targets. Only the best equations based on the basic test statistics as well as the 
mean absolute percentage error are reported. 
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Table 7: Regression results of money supply components 
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Behavioural relations 
Net foreign assets equation 
ES4. NFAZ = 6408.5 - 1483.7 ERA + 0.7485 CGTZ, - 18.4959 DBDSZ - 3.9066 BOPTBZC 
(2.7983)(-14.7741) (2.5389) (-3.0151) (-10.0840) 
A-R2 = 0.9925 
F = 565.3495 
DW = 2.6908 
MAPE = 9.1732% 
TIC = 3.0287 
Total claims on government equation 
ES5. CGTZ = 12028.4 + 2.2748 GEZ, - 2.4417 T Z 1 1 2 6 7 . 9 D83TLR 
(7.3229)(11.6358) (11.5439) (-7.6665) 
A-R2 = 0.9718 
F = 138.8087 
DW = 2.2283 
MAPE = 10.7865% 
TIC = 3.2843 
C-0 AR(1) CON = 3 iterations 
Cocoa financing function 
ES6. COCZ = 444.2228 + 16.5354 ERA + 0.5923 COCZ, + 5928.2 D83TL 
(0.4311) (0.1363) (0.4391) (2.4964) 
A-R2 = 0.8927 
F = 34.2804 
DW = 2.1885 
MAPE = 28.5505% 
TIC = 5.3433 
C-0 AR(1) CON = 3 iterations 
Credit to rest of economy equation 
ES7. CREZ = 1165.5 + 0.0437 YZ-0.1226 NFAZ-1714.9 DR+ 1757.9 RD 
(1.2856) (8.7985) (-4.8733) (-4.0122) (3.7952) 
A-R2 = 0.9954 
F = 731.8102 
DW = 2.1815 
MAPE = 7.2053% 
TIC = 2.6843 
C-0 AR(1) CON = 4 iterations 
Currency (with non-bank public) function 
ES8. CUZ = 2736.0 + 0.0206 YZ + 2763.2 D82PROB + 3.4702 P, 
(-2.765) (1.6685) (2.6269) (3.4065) 
A-R2 = 0.9947 
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F = 1063.9 
DW = 2.0745 
MAPE = 5.5829% 
TIC = 2.3628 
Demand deposit function 
ES9. DDZ = 33455.8 + 0.0805 YZ - 7.3291 POPU - 52.5526 NOB - 2504.2 D82PROB + 
84.2332 RD 
(1.6927) (13.8168) (-1.3126) (-0.9542) (-1.4247) (0.5550) 
A-R2 = 0.9948 
F = 547.1428 
DW = 1.2278 
MAPE = 7.6283% 
TIC = 2.7619 
C-O AR(1) CON = 7 iterations 
Quasi-Money (savings and time deposits) equation 
ES10. MQUAZ = -46.2530 + 0.1158 YZ - 5.7208 PGDP,- 3421.3 D82 
(-0.1204)(7.6091) (-4.6034) (-3.1437) 
A-R2 = 0.9833 
F = 236.7812 
DW = 2.5286 
MAPE = 11.9731% 
TIC = 3.4602 
C-O AR(1) CON = 6 iterations 
Revaluation losses equation 
ES11. RVAZ = -5471.3 + 1051.5 ERZ 
(-0.1612) (4.0269) 
A-R2 = 0.8220 
F = 10.2351 
DW = 2.0461 
MAPE = 10.0081% 
TIC = 3.1636 
C-O AR(1) CON = 3 iterations 
Establishing the annual monetary targets 
The broad money stock at the end of 1992 is 0519.34 billion. (See Table 8.) Since the 
nominal GDP for 1992 is 03008.78 billion, the transactions velocity is 5.79 times at the 
end of December 1992. Based on the format above, the projected stock of money for the 
end of 1993 is 0636.18 billion, while nominal GDP is projected to be 03,745.93 billion, 
bringing the transactions velocity to 5.89 times, indicating a slight increase in financial 
intermediation from 17.27% to 16.98%. 
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Table 8: Monetary programme, 1991-1993 
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In billion cedis Dec-91 Dec-92 Dec-93 Equation 
end-period data Act Act Proj Utilized 
Net foreign assets 
Bank of Ghana 
Deposit money banks 
Net domestic assets 
-97.52 -98.47 
-141.52 -142.47 
44.00 44.00 
408.40 602.91 
-90.24 ES4 
-134.24 Derived 
44.00 Exogenous 
711.55 ES2 
Net credit to government 294.63 397.11 476.53 ES5 
of which excl rev losses -73.81 -86.54 -92.54 ES11 
Cocoa board financing (gross) 36.88 56.70 87.89 ES6 
Credit to rest of economy 102.90 128.85 163.69 ES7 
of which "sound" credit 99.00 100.00 143.69 Exogenous 
Other items, net -26.01 20.25 -16.56 Residual 
Revaluation account 26.00 26.00 26.00 Exogenous 
Broad money (M2Z) 325.78 519.34 636.18 ED1b 
Narrow money (M1Z) 229.19 360.69 432.83 S3/Derived 
Currency (M0Z) 90.03 183.48 220.01 ES8 
Demand deposit 139.16 177.21 210.82 ES9 
Quasi money 96.53 158.66 203.35 ES10 
Saving deposit 79.01 116.39 134.51 Ratio/Decomposition 
Time deposit 17.58 42.27 68.84 Ratio/Decomposition 
SDR allocation 11.13 11.13 11.13 Exogenous 
Nominal GDP 2574.77 3008.78 3745.93 Macro Model 
Velocity of circulation 
GDP/end-period M2 7.90 5.79 5.89 Ratio 
Source of history: IMF and Bank of Ghana. 
1991 and 1992 are actuals and are subject to revision by the Bank of Ghana. 
The 1993 figures are projections using our model; they are for illustration 
only and may not be the same as the preliminary actuals. 
The next question to answer is: What are the sources of money supply and how much 
should each component rise to be consistent with an end-of-year annual stock of 0654.13 
billion derived from the money demand function? Table 8 presents the annual financial 
programme using the empirical money supply model. The targets are obtained by purely 
conditional mechanical forecasts. Thus they are subject to the path traced by the rate of 
inflation, interest rate assumptions, balance of payments, public finance especially credit 
to government, exchange rate, income assumptions, etc. 
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Sequence analysis of determining projections 
in Table 8 
The targets established in Table 8 are obtained using a computerized version of our 
financial model based on TSP Version 8.0. The simultaneous nature of the simulation 
and model solution exercise compels us to use TSP, which is capable of handling a 
system of over 700 parameters. It is possible to use the basic model for forecasting 
provided all the pre-determined and exogenous variables are loaded with all the identities 
and transformation equations. The aim of this subsection is to explain the mechanical 
sequence of how the financial programming model works in establishing the targets. 
Broad money demand (M2Z) 
The first stage of establishing the monetary targets begins with the determination of the 
demand for money. The money demand function in Equation EDlb is used to obtain the 
nominal broad money as illustrated above. With the nominal money growth rate, m2z, of 
22.4978%, and a level of 0519.34 billion in 1992, the nominal broad money for 1993 is 
derived as follows: 
M2Z93 = (1 + m2z)(M2Z92) 
= (1.224978)(519.34) 
= 636.18 
Components of broad money supply (assets side) 
The second major stage in the determination of the monetary programme addresses the 
components of sources of money supply. The net foreign assets (NFAZ) is obtained from 
the behavioural equation ES4. The projection of the component for DMBs (NFAZDMB) is 
exogenously determined. With the two variables known, the net assets accruing to the 
Bank of Ghana (NFAZB0G) are then derived. 
The net domestic assets (NDAZ) starts with the determination of net credit to 
government (CTGZ) and revaluation losses (RVAZ), cocoa financing (COCZ) and credit 
to the rest of the economy (CREZ), using equations ES5, ES11, ES6 and ES7, respectively. 
The residual (ONAZ) is needed to compute the total NDAZ. In order to obtain this 
residual we use equation SI to obtain the result less the residual that must be equal to the 
value forecasted from EDlb . The SDR allocation, which is exogenous, must be included 
on the assets side. The difference between M2Z from SI and EDl b should be equal to 
ONAZ given an exogenous revaluation account. It is to be noted that CGTZ includes the 
revaluation losses other than the one in the constant revaluation account. 
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Components of broad money supply (liabilities side) 
The third major stage in the sequence involves the determination of the liabilities of the 
monetary authorities. It begins with establishing the targets for currency with the non-
bank public (MOZ) and demand deposit (DDZ) using equations ES8 and ES9, respectively. 
Narrow money (M1Z) liabilities are then derived using Equation S3. Equation ES10 is 
used to obtain the value for quasi money (MQUAZ); the pattern of saving and time 
deposits behaviour is used to establish the relativities using saving-MQUAZ ratio. 
The nominal GDP, which is the product of the price level and the real GDP, is obtained 
from Ghana's policy framework paper (PFP), budget statements and development plans, 
or it can be derived from a macro model of Ghana (Dordunoo, 1995b). 
It is noteworthy that there is not much need for concern about the composition of the 
liabilities side of the balance sheet. It is important, however, to exclude deposits that are 
savings and allow the public and banks to decide how they may divide up the narrow 
money between cash and deposits. 
Selected monthly/quarterly leading indicators 
The most important leading indicators to be monitored in order to detect whether the 
targets are on track are the foreign exchange rate and the rate of inflation (Dordunoo, 
1994a). The foreign exchange rate developments may be a result of excess credit creation 
or monetary growth vis-a-vis a shortfall in foreign exchange supply on the market; they 
therefore, signal the need to apply the monetary breaks through the instrumental variables. 
The next indicator is the rate of inflation (Dordunoo, 1995a). It is important to note, 
however, that the path traced by growth in nominal monetary stock and inflation rates 
reveals a lag structure. This makes it difficult to rely on the inflation rate as the only 
leading indicator. The joint use of the rates of inflation and depreciation may give a 
better idea of the trend of monetary growth - whether there is excess or shortage in 
money supply to meet the desired growth in money demand. 
VIII. Conclusions 
After a decade of adjustment we propose in this study that financial programming must 
be based on the absorptive capacity of the economy endogenously derived, a removal of 
direct credit ceilings, and an institutionalization of an indirect control of targets using 
operating intermediate instruments, the open market operations (OMOs), directives and 
moral suasion. 
It is apparent from our observations and analysis that the practice of monetary 
management in Ghana has been fraught with failures. This has affected the structure of 
incentives in the financial market, causing economic agents to respond in ways that may 
not result in efficient allocation of scarce financial resources. Moreover, the distortions 
produced unreliable economic signals (indicators), making it difficult to control the money 
stock effectively and resulting in overshooting of targets. 
We have proposed an alternative monetary management framework that avoids the 
mistakes (a result of direct controls based on assumed velocity) of the past and introduces 
a new dimension to the process of monetary management in Ghana. Clearly, the success 
of our suggested framework hinges on an accurate estimation of the absorptive capacity 
of the economy as determined by the demand for and supply of money. Although it does 
not have the attribute of simplicity to commend it as is the current practice in Ghana, it 
serves to provide better information about the structure of the economy over time -
allowing for an improved assessment of how monetary aggregates and money market 
conditions are related to the economy - and, as a result, better control of the money stock 
in Ghana. 
In the regression equations the point is made about the possibility of spurious 
correlation. Thus the agenda ahead requires the up-date of the data series and the analysis 
of the monetary targeting models using the techniques of cointegration and stationarity. 
This study cannot pretend to provide all the answers to the issue of monetary programming 
that will guide the management of money in an economy. Nevertheless, it brings some 
very fundamental issues and the difficulties that may confront financial management in 
the absence of a good monetary survey. 
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Notes 
1. The analytical framework reviewed here does not necessarily reflect the general 
financial programming framework of the Fund as presented in Occasional Paper 55 
(IMF, 1987). It is based on the monetary accounting framework and policy stance of 
Ghana as well as the discussions of the monetary survey with the monetary authority 
of Ghana. 
2. Owing to the caution due to the safety valve created, the targets set in the monetary 
survey were generally not exceeded. This implies that the credit squeeze was biting 
more than was stated in the policy framework paper and the monetary survey. 
3. The impact analysis of credit ceiling in the rest of this section draws heavily and 
directly from Dordunoo (1996). 
Appendix: Selected money demand 
equations and historical 
simulation results 
Ordinary least squares estimation 
Dependent variable is LNM2 
22 observations used for estimation from 1971 to 1992 
Regressor Coefficient Standard error T-ratio 
INPT .2926 4.1000 .0714 
LNY .1444 .6091 .2371 
DLNCPI -.4364 .2329 -1.8740 
LNDR -.0373 .1226 -.3046 
LNM2(-1) .8148 .2091 3.8964 
R-squared .7482 F-statistic F(4,17) 12.6302 
R-bar-squared .6890 SE of regression .1432 
Residual sum of squares .3488 Mean of dependent variable 6.9689 
SD of dependent variable .2568 Maximum of log-likelihood 14.3711 
DW-statistic 1.7768 Durbin's h-statistic 2.6889 
Diagnostic tests 
Test statistics* LM Version * F Version * 
* A: Serial correlation * 
* 
* 
CHI-SQ( 1) * =.1106* F( 1, 16)= * * .0808 * 
* B: Functional form * 
* 
CHI-SQ( 1) * = .0062395 * F( 1, 16)= .0045391 * 
* C: Normality 
* 
* CHI-SQ( 2) 
* 
= 1.0746 * Not applicable * 
* D: Heteroscedasticity * CHI-SQ( 1) = 1.5037 * F( 1, 20)= 1.4673 * 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
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Residuals and fitted values of regression 
4 1 
Based on OLS regression of LNM2 on: 
INPT LNY DLNCPI LNDR LNM2(-1) 
22 observations used for estimation from 1971 to 1992 
Observation Actual 
1971 6.9722 
1972 7.1690 
1973 7.1542 
1974 7.1709 
1975 7.2539 
1976 7.3035 
1977 7.2562 
1978 7.2242 
1979 7.0344 
1980 6.9038 
1981 6.7526 
1982 6.7493 
1983 6.2703 
1984 6.4923 
1985 6.7786 
1986 6.8651 
1987 6.9655 
1988 7.0353 
1989 7.0226 
1990 6.9752 
1991 6.8168 
1992 7.1506 
MAPE 
Fitted Residual 
7.0590 -.0868 
7.0978 .0712 
7.2438 -.0896 
7.2396 -.0688 
7.1821 .0718 
7.1642 .1393 
7.0652 .1911 
7.1164 .1078 
7.1345 -.1001 
6.9906 -.0868 
6.7098 .0428 
6.8484 -.0991 
6.5671 -.2968 
6.3812 .1111 
6.6724 .1062 
6.8565 .0086339 
6.8782 .0873 
6.9870 .0482 
7.0742 -.0517 
7.0283 -.0531 
7.0587 -.2419 
6.9614 .1892 
10.6785 
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Cochrane-Orcutt method AR (1) Converged after 6 iterations 
Dependent variable is LNM2 
22 observations used for estimation from 1971 to 1992 
Regressor Coefficient Standard error T-ratio 
INPT -.3752 4.8342 -.0776 
LNY .2949 .7807 .3777 
DLNCPI -.4261 .2601 -1.6382 
LNDR -.0743 .1622 -.4577 
LNM2(-1) .7385 .3203 2.3055 
R-squared .7567 F-statistic F( 5, 15) 9.3284 
R-bar-squared .6755 SE of regression .1499 
Residual sum of squares .3371 Mean of dependent variable 6.9689 
SD of dependent variable .2568 Maximum of log-likelihood 13.5872 
DW-statistic 1.7882 
Parameters of the autoregressive error specification 
U = .1178*U(- 1)+V 
(.3112) 
T-ratio(s) based on asymptotic standard errors in brackets 
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Residuals and fitted values of regression 
4 3 
Based on fixed initial value(s) CO-AR( 1) regression of LNM2 on: 
INPT LNY DLNCPI LNDR LNM2(-1) 
22 observations used for estimation from 1971 to 1992 
Observation Actual Fitted Transformed residual 
1971 6.9722 *NONE* *NONE* 
1972 7.1690 7.1035 .0655 
1973 7.1542 7.2696 -.1154 
1974 7.1709 7.2576 -.0867 
1975 7.2539 7.1703 .0836 
1976 7.3035 7.1628 .1407 
1977 7.2562 7.0758 .1804 
1978 7.2242 7.1270 .0972 
1979 7.0344 7.1313 -.0969 
1980 6.9038 6.9761 -.0723 
1981 6.7526 6.6945 .0581 
1982 6.7493 6.8663 -.1170 
1983 6.2703 6.5536 -.2833 
1984 6.4923 6.3822 .1101 
1985 6.7786 6.7042 .0744 
1986 6.8651 6.8725 -.0073700 
1987 6.9655 6.8813 .0842 
1988 7.0353 6.9915 .0438 
1989 7.0226 7.0792 -.0566 
1990 6.9752 7.0275 -.0523 
1991 6.8168 7.0626 -.2457 
1992 7.1506 6.9551 .1955 
MAPE 10.3049 
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